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Mobilizing local resources in developing countries
ROY BAHL, JERRY MINER AND LARRY SCHROEDER
The Maxwell School. Syracuse University

SUMMARY
Many developing countries are putting increased pressure on local governments to mobilize
resources, especially to meet the recurrent costs of operating and maintaining locally sited
capital projects. Local taxes, user charges and voluntary contributions are all possible
mechanisms to carry out these efforts. Yet several important issues arise whenever these
mobilization instruments are contemplated and evaluated.
Several, often competing, objectives must be considered when evaluating fiscal instruments
including the ability of the mechanism to raise revenues, its effect on economic efficiency, its
equity implications and its administrative feasibility. After discussing each of these
objectives, we show how numerous constraints, including those imposed by the political/legal
system, administrative structure, the economy and the culture of the country, must be
recognized while searching for a workable set of reforms that will mobilize additional
resources without doing great harm to the other objectives. The key to these reforms would
seem to be incentives or disincentives inherent in the revenue structure. Without recognizing
these incentives or attempting to alter them, resource mobilization efforts are likely to go
astray.
INTRODUCTION

The current interest in local government resource mobilization in developing
countries is hardly surprising. It stems from several sources: (a) the push to
decentralize government decision making, (b) the desire to improve the relative
quality of life in secondary cities and rural areas both for its own sake and to slow
the rate of migration to the largest cities, and (c) the recognition that local
governments might be in a better position than the central government to capture
local taxable capacity outside major cities and to determine appropriate local service
priorities. With this new concern for local government resource mobilization has
come a number of difficult questions. What mechanisms are available for increasing
local government revenues in developing countries? How can the substantial
administrative barriers be overcome? What standards might be used to judge
whether one revenue raising system is more or less suitable than another?
This paper is an attempt to address some of these issues in a context of the current
practice in LDCs. Three types of revenue mobilization schemes are considered
throughout this paper: taxation, voluntary contributions and user charges. Too
often the focus is exclusively on taxation, but in a sense the three are alternatives and
all are important in the LDC context. User charges may take the form of direct
The authors are Professors of Economics and Public Administration and Senior Research Associates in
the Metropolitan Studies Program of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse
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payments by beneficiaries for such services as water, sewers or transportation, or
may be seen by the local government as fees raised from locally managed public
enterprises such as markets or slaughterhouses. The use of voluntary labour to build
a road, construct a school building or repair an irrigation canal is not an uncommon
practice in rural areas in developing countries.
In the next section we review several objectives that, ideally, should be met in a
revenue scheme. The focus of the third section is on the trade-offs among objectives
and on the constraints placed upon resource mobilization proposals at the local
government level. The discussion in the fourth section is of the role of incentives in
mobilizing more resources through the local public sector.'

OBJECTIVES OF REVENUE REFORMS

There are several general objectives against which any local revenue scheme might be
judged. These include the ability to raise revenues, effects on economic efficiency or
neutrality, equity implications and administrative feasibility.
Mobilizing resources

Foremost among the criteria for evaluation is the ability to raise revenues. We are
interested here in both the potential for mobilizing sufficient resources at any given
point in time and the potential for stable growth with an increasing demand for
public services.
The first of these concerns, revenue adequacy, depends on the levels of the rate
and base. An overriding difficulty facing most localities in developing countries is
the small size of the available revenue base. For example, local governments in rural
areas may be able to devise any number of methods of collecting revenue—e.g.
charging for a sheep dip, levying a wheel tax on vehicles, charging vendors an
entrance fee to the market, charging a berthing fee for boats. Unfortunately, none
of these is likely to have a large enough base to produce substantial revenues at low
rates of tax. The question, then, is whether high enough rates can be imposed.
The answer, of course, is that the rates applied to a small base cannot be increased
without limit. One constraint is legal, i.e. the central government often imposes a
strict rate limit on all local government taxes. Moreoever, high rates will be more
likely to produce excess burdens through reactions in behaviour by taxpayers
attempting to avoid the levy (discussed below) and possibly will increase evasion of
the tax. Furthermore, any inequities inherent in the levy will be exacerbated by
higher rates. This, then, suggests a need for policies designed to broaden the base for
resource mobilization—either through redefinition of the base or identification of
new revenue sources.
The second criterion, sufficient growth, has to do with the elasticity of the revenue
source.' That is, as the resource needs of local governments increase due to
' The recent book by Kenneth Davey (1983) addresses many of the same issues as are raised here. He does
not, however, consider the role that voluntary efforts may play in resource mobilization and places less
emphasis on the importance of incentives.
' The term 'elasticity' is usually taken to refer to the percentage increase in revenues associated with each
1 per cent increase in local income.
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population growth, increased service demands or inflation, a 'good' revenue source
will respond in like manner. For example, if prices for the inputs used by a local
government increased, one would want revenues to expand without the need for
discretionary or administrative changes in the tax base or rate. The principle here is
that the revenue base should be as responsive to inflation or real economic
expansion as are spending needs.
Certainty or stability of revenue growth, too, cannot be ignored when evaluating
resource-raising instruments. Erratic growth not systematically related to changes in
income, population or prices creates considerable uncertainty in budgeting and
hinders longer term planning. Although this aspect of revenue growth and adequacy
is often ignored, it constitutes a major project for many local bodies and is often
traceable to administrative practices which either fail to capture increases in the
revenue base or are inconsistent over time, thereby leading to revenue instability.
Tax revenue sources based on the gross receipts of businesses, sales or income are
likely to be responsive to inflation or to increases in local economic activity.
Property taxes, on the other hand, may not be so elastic, since they depend greatly
upon the administrative structure by which the tax base is determined. Much
research on the subject indicates a low income elasticity to the property tax (Bahl,
1979).
Still less responsive are the personal taxes used in rural sectors where land tenure
considerations preclude taxes on agricultural land. Head taxes, taxes on occupations
and licences do not respond to changing conditions or expenditure needs. For
example, personal taxes (including poll and graduated personal taxes) have, since
1970, become much less important revenue sources for central governments in most
African states (Wozny, 1983).
Contributions, both monetary and in-kind, rarely account for substantial
amounts of revenue, and their growth potential is limited.' Even in societies where
tribal customs favour voluntary communal services, they are not responsive to
current circumstances. One might even expect voluntary contributions to fall off as
income rises. For example, as wages increase, especially in real terms, fewer and
fewer local labourers are willing to donate their services to the local governments
because of their higher opportunity costs. This suggests that the income elasticity of
this revenue source will be low. In a similar manner, the responsiveness of these
revenues to inflation may be low if labourers suffer from a 'monetary illusion' and
do not recognize that increased money wages in the face of inflation do not
constitute increases in real wages.
User charges and fees offer an opportunity to raise significant amounts of
revenue, but generally offer a low potential for growth. Most charges are tied to the
number of units of a service consumed, e.g. a gallon of water or a bus ride, and do
not respond to income or inflation. Legal rate changes, which are politically
unpopular, are required to increase revenues. On the other hand, increased
populations may yield greater usage of these services, thereby raising revenues.

'Miller (1983) suggests, however, that it is hard to account for voluntarism in local governments in a
developing country context. She notes, for example, that in Bangladesh, many local government officials
'donate' their time even though it is never formally accounted for.
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Economic efficiency

Resource raising techniques nearly always affect some economic choice. Given the
revenue bases available to rural local governments in developing countries, the
choices in question may include whether to live in a high taxing or low taxing
jurisdiction, whether to improve a building at the risk of property tax increase,
whether to support a proposal for a local capital improvement at the risk of paying a
benefit charge or whether to volunteer labour to the public sector in return for a
public sector benefit. To the extent that local taxes and charges alter choices that
otherwise would have been made, they are economically inefficient.
Such inefficiencies may or may not be detrimental in terms of local and national
objectives. For example, a business licence may raise the cost of doing business in a
community but can be a justifiable charge for the proximity to public services which
the business enjoys. On the other hand, some revenue sources may have built-in
non-neutralities that are undesirable. The local property tax is an often-cited culprit.
Placing a heavier tax burden on the value of improvements (buildings and
equipment) than on the value of land discourages investment in improvements. To
the extent that investments in these improvements contribute to economic growth,
such inefficiencies are undesirable. However, in many LDCs, the problem is
mitigated because rates are so low. Furthermore, differential rates on used versus
idle land (with the latter taxed more heavily) are also used in some developing
countries where land speculation and non-development is a problem.
User charges and fees raise other important efficiency issues. One problem arises
when local authorities attempt to recoup full costs with charges for activities which
generate benefits to non-users as well as users. For example, a health clinic provides
benefits even to those not innoculated against contagious diseases. Efficiency
requires charging users only for that portion of the marginal costs of the service that
benefits them and covering the remainder of the costs from general revenues. If
charges and fees are set too high, under-use of the service will result. On the other
hand, too low a price will produce over-use and either lower the effectiveness of the
service or fail to provide adequate revenues for maintenance of the activity. Still,
user fees provide the opportunity to mobilize resources in a manner that is both
reasonably equitable and reasonably efficient, for example when motor licence fees
are imposed on users of roads built and maintained from public funds."
The efficiency of a voluntary contribution of labour or materials depends on the
opportunity costs of the labour or material and the benefits it produces. At certain
times of the year in developing countries the opportunity cost of labour is extremely
low. During such times use of labour for public projects has little or no opportunity
cost other than the value of leisure foregone and perhaps extra food consumption
required. Efficiency requires, however, that the individuals who donate labour
derive benefits from the project at least equal to the low opportunity costs.
Equity

Equity is an overriding concern, especially in developing countries where inequality
in the distribution of income and wealth is pronounced. The problem is that equity
' Efficient pricing of roads in developing countries is emphasized by Walters (1968). For a discussion of
these and other, more general issues regarding user fees see Local Revenue Administration Project (1983).
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means different things to different people. One interpretation is that those better
able to bear the burden of resource mobilization ought to pay more than those in less
fortunate circumstances. In practice, this is sometimes translated into tax policies
where those with relatively small property holdings are exempt from the property tax
or where progressively higher rates are applied to higher valued properties.'
Although such provisions for vertical equity are desirable in that they seem 'fair',
they may give rise to other, undesirable effects. For example, the granting of
exemptions for lower income taxpayers may erode the tax base, whereas the use of a
progressive rate structure may encourage uneconomic splitting of holdings to avoid
the tax. Both actions might encourage the payment of bribes to the property tax
administrators to place the property into a lower-valued property classification.
The equity criterion can also be interpreted to mean that those who benefit from
particular services should contribute proportionately to the financing of these
services. The benefits-received version of equity in taxation is usually associated
with special assessments and user charges rather than with general taxation.
Betterment levies and special assessments on properties which benefit most from a
particular capital investment, e.g. a new water project or an improved road, reflect
an attempt to distribute financing according to benefits received (Macon and
Manon, 1977; Doebele, Grimes and Linn, 1979).
In a similar manner, user charges based on the cost of providing services can
conform to the benefit criterion of equity. In the context of developing countries,
however, these methods of resource mobilization are likely to be at variance with
ability-to-pay criteria. Yet, in the absence of user charges, highly beneficial services
such as water supply and ferry service may not be provided at all, and others, such as
wells and irrigation ditches, may deteriorate owing to lack of funds for maintenance
and operating expenditures. Thus, the ability-to-pay criterion of equity needs to be
applied with appropriate concern that it not totally curtail service provision.
In-kind services raise serious equity questions. Voluntary arrangements may
specify equitable labour contributions for projects, and local customs and the
influence of local leaders may ensure compliance with these provisions. On the other
hand, inequitable distribution of the burdens of in-kind services inevitably leads to
the withdrawal of voluntary services. The use of compulsory labour services for
local projects in the colonial periods of most developing countries has left a legacy
of negative attitudes toward this policy; consequently, relatively little serious
consideration is given to proposals for compulsory, in-kind contributions of services
in developing countries (outside of China). Still, local responsibility for the
construction of buildings with voluntary labour for centrally provided
administrative or educational staff is characteristic of many parts of francophone
Africa.
Administrative feasibility

It is one thing to set down on paper an ideal revenue system, but quite another to
implement it successfully. Although the constraints discussed below play a crucial
role in determining the administrative feasibility of any revenue source, the general
= See, for example, Bahl (1979) and Harriss (1979). As Harriss (p. 195) notes, however, progressive rates
based upon value of property do not necessarily translate into progressivity in terms of income.
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question that must be asked is whether or not, given these constraints, the resource
mobilization system can be carried out in a just manner. For example, if few local
businesses keep written records of transactions, a general retail sales tax that
exempts 'necessities' (which may look fine on paper in terms of its elasticity,
economic efficiency and equity) will in fact be impossible to administer. Likewise, in
a village where nearly all of the transactions are made in-kind and most residents are
illiterate, there is little likelihood that an equitable income tax can be collected. Even
when simpler head or asset taxes are used, the task of maintaining an up-to-date
census of population, land or livestock may exceed local administrative capacity.
Recommendations for improved tax procedures thus require investigation of such
factors as whether or not tax maps have been drawn, the capabilities of the local
revenue administration personnel and, whether or not most local properties are
privately owned rather than owned by tribes, classes or extended families. This
suggests the need for a thorough understanding of the economic, administrative and
institutional and cultural constraints associated with the area.

CONSTRAINTS
Any resource mobilization effort will be made within an institutional frame. An
understanding of these institutions and the contraints that they pose is a necessary
first step in any reform effort aimed at increased mobilization. Here we note
legal/political contraints, constraints imposed by the administrative structure,
economic contraints and technological or cultural constraints. The lesson is that,
although one should search for an optimal resource mobilization package, no more
than an acceptable second or third best solution may be possible."
Legal/political constraints
Although some alteration of the statutory basis of particular revenue sources is
usually necessary to improve the revenue structure, a complete overhaul of the
existing legal framework is unrealistic and probably even undesirable. Such changes
are less likely to be carried out than are improvements in administration or in
provisions of existing revenue sources.
The trick is in recognizing which constraints can be bent and which cannot and in
knowing whether institutional reforms are necessary or whether roughly comparable
results might be had from less drastic changes. Two common issues come quickly to
mind. The first has to do with the assignment of functions—the division of taxing
powers and expenditure responsibility among levels of government. Some taxes are
specifically reserved for higher level of governments whereas others are made
available for local government financing. Whether this division is by Constitution or
long-standing custom, it presents a very rigid constraint in most countries. To be
sure, there have been gradual changes in the assignment of financing and spending
responsibilities, but these are 'harder' reforms than modifications of presently
available tax bases.
' A more general, and more pessimistic, view of the problems associated with budget-related reforms is
givenby Selwyn(1982).
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The revenue assignment issue is a particularly troublesome one. As Davey (1983)
notes, central governments tend to reserve for themselves the most elastic and
productive revenue instruments. Although this can be justified in some instances,
e.g. on grounds of administrative convenience or due to inefficiencies or inequities
which would result if each locality imposed its own levy, in other cases it can be done
primarily to gain political favour. For example, the abolition of the community tax
in Nigerian states in 1980 may have been as much a political ploy as a legitimate
policy to improve the local revenue structure.' It certainly did little to support the
1976 local government reform's goal of community autonomy.
The political system and the degree of patronage embedded within that system
constitutes another serious constraint. Altering these political arrangements is
unlikely. Thus, if the Ministry of Local Government has statutory responsibility
over all local financial affairs, it is unrealistic to expect that a programme carried
out by a rival ministry will be gracefully endorsed by both ministries, even if the
programme has potentially large local revenue implications. The ministry in charge
of the programme, unless it is likely to gain additional power or political 'points'
through a successful administration of this programme, is likely to approach it
enthusiastically whereas the Ministry of Local Government may see it as an
infringement upon its own authority and may even impede its successful completion.
For example, a property tax administration reform programme initiated through the
Ministry of Local Government in the Philippines was constrained from the outset
because local assessors and treasurers were in fact employees of the Ministry of
Finance (Holland, Wasylenko and Bahl, 1980). Another example of this problem is
the use of food-for-work programmes in Bangladesh as a grant for rural works
activities. The explicit relief objectives of the Ministry of Food, where food-forwork programmes are administered, may run contrary to the development
objectives of the Rural Works Programme which is administered by the Ministry of
Local Government.
Administrative structure

Closely related to the above is the structural organization of administration within
the developing country. If, for example, local revenue officials are directly tied to
the higher levels of government, programmes that are primarily initiated and carried
out at the local level may be unsuccessful. This lack of success may not be due to any
inherent weakness in the programme, but because it is not in the best long-term
interest of the local revenue officer to conform to the proposed local reform. In the
same manner, if different departments within a local government must co-operate in
order for a local revenue source to be successfully administered, joint inputs of
higher officials are required. Yet such co-operation is much more difficult to achieve
than in the case where their own success is directly tied to such co-operation.
There are formal administrative arrangements for handling potential conflicts
among field offices of central ministries through designation of the representative of
one ministry, usually the Ministry of the Interior, to supervise and co-ordinate the
regional activities of other ministries. As the above illustrations demonstrate, such
' This policy was, of course, less difficult to implement given the large increase in Nigeria's oil revenues
during that same period.
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arrangements are often insufficient to reconcile the varying goals, motives and
incentives of representatives of diflFerent central agencies.
Although one should not rule out any attempt to alter the administrative
structure, the severity of administrative constraints must be recognized. It is
essential to recognize these constraints and to work within them rather than to
propose a total reorganization of the structure when focusing on improved resource
mobilization techniques.
Economic constraints

Local governments are not isolated entities. They exist within a larger economy and,
whereas their own resource constraints may preclude particular 'solutions' to
resource mobilization problems, it also must be recognized that broader
macroeconomic considerations may also arise (especially where the governmental
structure is a unitary one). Currently, many developing countries are experiencing
foreign exchange and inflationary difficulties. To ignore entirely these constraints
may lead to a set of recommendations that, within the broader context, are entirely
unrealistic. For example, although a significant increase in grants to localities may
seem justified, it may be an impossible short-term objective if the central
government is already facing budgetary deficits. Also, programmes aimed at
services relevant to increased local agricultural production for export require
exchange rate policies which do not so overvalue local currencies as to price such
exports out of world markets.
Technological, cultural and institional constraints

Efforts to improve local revenue mobilization must also recognize the current
environment in which the local government operates. To advise computerized
annual reassessment of property values in an environment in which computers are
nearly non-existent is, of course, totally unrealistic. Likewise, if many transactions
are carried out on a barter or in-kind basis, the use of monetary resource
mobilization tools is inappropriate.
When devising a new set of practices or policies, one must keep in mind the
institutions that exist currently and their limited capacity. To recommend increased
use of credit financing for development projects when the national credit market is
almost totally undeveloped is as unrealistic as recommending the imposition of a
sales tax where transactions are nearly all of the barter variety.
Cultural considerations also play a role in the determination of feasible policy
options. For example, within the context of an Islamic society, certain taxes and
debt financing may be limited by religious doctrine (Shemesh, 1969; Karsten, 1982,
pp. 108-142). Similarly, resource mobilization techniques that are carry-overs from
colonial times may be viewed with sufficient suspicion to preclude their inclusion in
a menu of taxes, fees or voluntary contributions.
INCENTIVES AS THE KEY TO RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

Given these objectives and constraints, we would argue that the provision of
incentives and disincentives is a key to improving local government resource
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mobilization. These incentives may be focused on different actors—taxpayers,
administrators and local government decision-makers.
Compliance incentives

The incentives associated with taxpayer behaviour can be tied to penalties for not
paying, the benefits of complying, and the cost of compliance. These incentives may
be instituted in a variety of ways including revenue structure revisions, changes in
collection procedures and moral suasion applied by community leaders.
Benefits of paying
Increased revenue mobilization in developing countries may be as much a job of
'selling' as it is of direct administration, i.e. the taxpayer may be more willing to pay
if he believes the taxes will be spent on something useful to him.' The potential
purchaser of a glass of beer does so because he sees it as yielding personal benefits.
In the same manner, the potentially complying taxpayer may be much more likely to
co-operate if there are perceived benefits associated with such action. The transfer
of tax receipts to the central government treasury is generally perceived as yielding
no benefits to local residents, but rather as supporting the salaries of government
bureaucrats, including the military, and to some extent those who have left the
countryside for the capital. Thus, to enhance voluntary tax compliance, taxpayers
must be convinced that a significant portion of their taxes will be retained locally
and that these revenues will be used for projects and services which they value.
Where there is not a high degree of tax compliance, campaigns designed to
illustrate the benefits to the potential taxpayer may be a necessary first step in the
process. This may be done in a number of ways. One of these is a simple passing of
information, i.e. holding village meetings to tell taxpayers what their tax money will
buy. A second possibility is to permit the village area to retain a percentage of the
amount collected, e.g. barangay (neighbourhood) units in the Philippines receive a
10 per cent share of property taxes collected in the barangay. A third possibility,
where traditional leaders still have a role in tax collection, is to compensate the
village chief with a percentage of taxes collected from residents of his village. This is,
for example, the case in Senegal where the village chiefs receive 7 per cent of the
'rural tax' (Wozny, 1983).
The previous arguments are also applicable in the case of voluntary contributions.
Moral suasion by community leaders is probably necessary to evoke response in this
revenue source. Taxpayer compliance and contributions may even be linked, for
example, when a community leader donates a parcel of land to the local government
but completion of the facility requires the generation of sufficient local revenues.
Penalties
Although the 'carrot' may work in some situations, the 'stick' can also be an
effective means of stimulating taxpayer compliance. Necessary conditions for
' This is why compliance incentives are less important in the case of user charges. With fees attached to a
publicly-provided service the payer is getting a direct benefit in return for his payment.
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imposing a cost on non-compliers are the existence of legal remedies and an effective
enforcement programme. By their very nature, voluntary contributions lack this
feature and thus are not amenable to this compliance technique.
The penalties themselves must be severe enough to be binding. One thinks
immediately of cash penalties equivalent to interest charges on unpaid amounts, but
many times these charges are too low, i.e. the rate of return to owners of capital in
LDCs may be so high that it would be profitable to be delinquent in paying taxes.
Other penalties can be more severe—the legal system may provide that the property
be sold at auction to recover back taxes, or that personal property be confiscated.
There is a direct relationship between the severity of the penality and the hesitance
of the government to enforce the penalty. The sanctions are especially difficult to
enforce in rural areas where the 'neighbourhood' includes the administrators. For
example, where a legal system provides that the tax-delinquent property be sold at
auction, a potential response is for no one to be willing to bid on the parcel.
Moreover, the taking of property is so drastic a step that it is opposed (perhaps
feared) by local politicians and administrators—to a point where very little use is
made of this penalty. On the other hand, there may be an advantage of the area
being small in size and population. If compliers recognize the 'free rider' problem
associated with non-compliers, they may put pressure on their non-taxpaying
neighbours. In such cases, techniques such as publishing or making public the list of
non-compliers may provide sufficient 'costs' to pressure the non-payer into action.
Other extra-legal incentives involve the tying of particular privileges to payment
of taxes. In some countries, properties on which there are taxes delinquent cannot be
sold until such delinquencies are cleared. This approach could be extended to require
that any transaction with the local government (or possibly even higher levels of
government) would not be possible until proof of payment on past-due taxes is
shown. For example, a local permit to transact retail or wholesale business may be
made contingent upon proof of payment of all local taxes. Few rural local
governments have carried the incentive approach this far.
In Upper Volta and other West African countries it is not uncommon for the
names of delinquent village taxpayers to be required to remain on display at the local
administrative centre until taxes are paid. Relatives, shamed by this display,
generally pay the amounts owing in a short time. Another example is the
requirement that tax receipts be shown in order to obtain travel permits, register a
birth or marriage, or enroll a child in primary school (Local Revenue
Administration Project, 1983, pp. 138-153).
But to carry out these policies successfully will require a degree of interagency and
even intergovernmental co-operation not always found in governmental institutions.
Compliance costs
The technology, institutions and possibly even culture in developing countries often
require that financial transactions be carried out on a face-to-face basis. With no
checking accounts or comparable financial instruments, and relatively little selfassessment, taxpayers are faced with the time and travel cost of paying taxes. If
these costs can be lowered without greatly burdening the local government, overall
rates of tax collection may improve.
A number of remedies have been applied. Programmes that take tax collectors 'to
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the people' rather than requiring the people to come to the tax collector, are
especially effective in rural areas. The allowance of discounts for those who pay
taxes on time is also a potentially powerful incentive.
Structural reforms
One major impediment to improved collection may lie with the structure of the tax.
People are more willing to pay taxes when they feel that they are being taxed fairly
(relative to their neighbours), when they understand how the tax is levied and when
the tax rate structure does not provide especially attractive gains from
underreporting. Any number of reforms have been instituted to deal with such
structural problems. The following are examples of the kinds of specific issues which
arise:
(a) Assessment biases in favour of higher income property taxpayers may
discourage other taxpayers from complying. Inconsistent assessments among
similarly situated taxpayers may produce the same result.
(b) High property transfer tax rates will induce sellers of property to understate
transaction values (Aim, 1983).
(c) Progressive business tax rates will provide an inducement for owners to
understate the base (e.g. gross sales) in order to reduce tax liability (Bahl and
Schroeder, 1983).
(d) Property taxes levied on the total value of all holdings may induce property
owners to split or sub-divide their property, or undertake other subterfuge to
reduce tax liabilities (Greytak, 1982).
These kinds of problems have led to many reforms of local tax systems. The
general direction of this reform is towards simplification, flat rate structures and
more standardization in assessment practices.
Administrative incentives

The role of the administrator in local taxation is crucial. Administrators as well as
taxpayers respond to incentives or discincentives in the system. It follows that
successful administration also requires the construction of a 'proper' set of
incentives.
Pecuniary incentives
Where there is little likelihood of pecuniary gain from 'successful' administrative
performance, effectiveness is likely to suffer. Yet, there may be few built-in
pecuniary incentives for doing a good job. Under a unitary governmental structure,
salary structures are generally determined by central civil service regulations with the
successful local financial manager compensated no differently from the less
successful manager. Although the negative incentive of dismissal potentially exists,
it may not be used often enough to be an effective management tool.
Where local government managers and administrators are employees of local
authorities, compensation is likely to be low in comparison with similar positions in
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the private sector and in the central government. This explains the shortage of
qualified personnel for such local staff as assessors, collectors, treasurers and
accountants in the local government sector and suggest that the training of local
staffs may be deficient. This raises another reason for poor revenue administration
performance and, although it suggests the need for training local government
workers, it must also be recognized that newly-trained employees may still be
attracted by higher paying jobs in other sectors. In fact, the creation of autonomous
bodies for transport and water supply, partly to get around salary limitations, is a
response to this constraint.
Power and advancement
Closely related to pecuniary incentives is simply power or advancement to more
influential positions. If these moves can somehow be related to performance, they
can also encourage improved performance.
Where a local financial manager feels that there is no likelihood that improved
performance will result in a 'better' position, or if poor performance is unlikely to
result in demotion, there is little reason to expect improvements in performance. For
example, if a tax collector feels that employment will continue whether or not
delinquent taxes are actually collected, there is little reason to expect this individual
to put forth much effort in carrying out the assigned duties. On the other hand, if
there is a likelihood that the successful collector will become a strong candidate for a
supervisory position, he may be more willing to carry out assigned duties
enthusiastically.
Return to risk
A related factor is the expected return associated with entering into a risky situation.
By nature, financial managers are conservative. Although this is not necessarily a
disadvantage, given the public nature of the job, innovations and ventures having
potentially larger payoffs can be stifled by this attitude. For example, analysis may
suggest that a new or expanded public market would be an efficient use of a
locality's scarce resources. But this may require a large capital investment and the
incurring of long-term debt. If the local fiscal manager is unlikely to be rewarded
should the venture be successful but can be punished if the debt is not paid off on
time, it is unlikely that the project will be pursued. Only if the manager can expect
that a successful market will increase the likelihood of advancement to a better
paying and/or more responsible position will he be a strong proponent for the
venture.
Governmental incentives

There are particular incentives associated with public sector decison-making that are
not necessarily in the best long-term interest of development efforts nor of effective
use of locally mobilized resources. These incentives tend to favour more visible,
shorter term projects over projects which can have longer term returns both as
regards growth and additional resource mobilization. Intergovernmental aid
provides an especially effective method of inserting incentives for greater resource
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mobilization into the system and can be carried out in a sufficiently selective manner
to alter the previously-mentioned expenditure biases.
Expenditure incentives
In democratic political systems, elections occur frequently.' As a result, political and
administrative decision-makers may prefer to undertake short-term projects with
immediate returns rather than long-term projects that may not be completed during
the present elected or appointed term. Such myopia is difficult to overcome;
nevertheless, techniques used by politicians everywhere such as erecting signs
reminding passers-by of the 'mayor's name or the construction of prominently
observable cornerstones may partially overcome the short-term bias. Closely related
to the preference of short-term payoff projects is the incentive to support 'visible'
projects, such as new municipal buildings, rather than infrastructure development
projects such as road repairs or water main improvements.'" Again, this bias is
difficult to overcome, although skillful politicians and officials may be able to
devise schemes to remind constituents that their 'tax money is at work here'. These
contraints are important and development is unlikely to proceed unless they can be
overcome.
These biases may be even more difficult to overcome when the project is aimed
primarily at improving resource mobilization efforts in the long-run. For example,
tax mapping for property tax purposes is seen as a desirable project but its payoffs
will be in the future. Convincing citizens of the desirability of tax mapping may
require a broad educational programme focusing on the fact that tax mapping may
increase the taxable base thereby reducing the relative burden on already-taxed
parcels. To encourage local policy makers to enter into such a project may require
that low interest loans or categorical matching grants be provided. Here the
expectation is that the locality will be better off over the longer term but that the
payoffs will be rapid enough so that currently elected officials can use these benefits
in their own re-election pursuits. Finally, local administrators of the property tax
system may have to be convinced that the existence of tax maps will make their jobs
easier to carry out, and that such efforts can indicate that they are 'successful' tax
administrators, and lead to advancement through a hierarchical personnel system.
In any case, to convince a locality to choose a project that is not going to yield
observable payoffs tomorrow is likely to require a concerted effort on all fronts if it
is to be endorsed and actively pursued by all of the relevant actors.
Foreign-donor financed capital projects raise another sort of issue. Seldom are
these donors willing to undertake responsibility for the recurrent costs associated
with the projects. Therefore, central government officials must decide whether or
not to accept donors' offers of such capital facilities. Although these officials are
reluctant to reject such offers, there may be no obvious means available to cover the
future recurrent operating and maintenance costs. In highly centralized unitary
states local government officials generally are representatives of the central ministry
' In fact, even where non-democratic regimes are in power, an often necessary condition to maintenance
of that power is a reasonably satisfied citizenry.
'"The problem is not restricted to developing countries. For a discussion of the U.S. infrastructure
problem, see Paterson et al. (forthcoming).
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and, therefore, do not seriously oppose the projects whereas locally-elected officials,
if there are any, have no infiuence over the matter. Thus, excess construction of
long-range capital projects is a common feature of development strategies, but
localities are probably better served by reducing resources invested in capital
projects and using them instead to maintain and operate existing capital (Heller,
1979; Club du Sahel, 1980)."
Intergovernmental aid
It is well recognized that intergovernmental aid arrangements may alter local
governmental behaviour of authorities with some degree of fiscal autonomy. The
local government's response to transfers is likely to depend upon the form of such
aid and, as well, may depend upon local preferences. Still it can provide a powerful
weapon in achieving greater resource mobilization.
Grants may elicit several responses from local governments. They may continue to
spend as much or more than would have been spent in the absence of such aid. When
local resource mobilization expands in response to the transfer, the aid is termed
stimulative. On the other hand, local governments may cut back on locally-raised
revenues and substitute the intergovernmental aid. Which response is more likely is
an especially crucial question when the stated objective of a higher level of
government is to stimulate local government activity. When the aid is substitutive
the system is actually acting contrary to its stated goals. Thus, to the extent that a
local government decreases its local tax raising efforts, for example by being less
concerned with tax delinquency or lowering its tax rates, it has responded perversely
to the intergovernmental aid system. One method by which such reactions can be
discouraged is by specifically including tax effort or matching requirements in the
aid distribution formula. In such cases those localities putting forth a greater effort
(relative to their own taxable capacity, however measured) are rewarded directly for
their efforts.
Intergovernmental aid may take the form of general purpose block grants which
can be used at the discretion of the locality, or as specific project or categorical
grants. Block grants have the positive efficiency effect of allowing the local
government to decide what is in its best interest. In this sense, a system of block
grants is preferable to a system of categorical or project-specific grants. On the other
hand, if a primary consideration in the intergovernmental grant system is to
promote development projects, the use of block grants may not yield the desired
objectives.
Categorical grants, on the other hand, have the ability to direct funds to specific
projects. The incentive associated with such categorical grants can be equated to a
lowering of the 'price' associated with this particular category of spending. A
lowering of the local price of a project has two, potentially conflicting, results. On
the one hand, the lowered price encourages greater effort toward that class of
projects and lesser effort towards alternatives. On the other hand, the grant may still
encourage local governments to reduce taxes, i.e. they may shift their spending
" Local public services data which show the low level of operational costs, particularly on materials and
supplies, in relation to capital spending by foreign donors in Upper Volta are presented in Local Revenue
Administration Project (1983, pp. 93-96).
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emphasis from A to B but they may view the influx of central assistance as
substitutive for what may have been higher local taxes. Requiring that local
governments share in the costs of these projects, for example, on a one-to-four or
one-to-three basis can help to avoid decreased resource mobilization efforts. Under
these conditions, it is in the locality's own best interest to continue raising revenues
which, in addition, ensures that the locality has a stake in the overall success of the
project.
In unitary forms of political organization central provision of resources to
localities takes another form. The assignment of employees of various of the
national functional ministries along with budgets for material and investments to
regional authorities constitutes an important resource without an accompanying
transfer of revenues. Thus, for example engineers may be assigned to localities by
the Public Works Ministry and teachers by the Ministry of Education along with
funds for certain operational expenses. The criteria which determine the overall
numbers of such personnel and their regional distribution operate similarly to grant
formulae. The presence of these personnel probably has some influence on the
amounts of local revenues collected and on the locally controlled expenditures, but
their effect is far less than grants-in-aid since the functions they perform are those
assigned to the central government and usually involve little or no expenditure from
local sources.
CONCLUSION
Achieving increased revenue raising goals through a system that simultaneously
pursues revenue sufficiency and elasticity, economic efficiency, equity and
administrability is difficult. First, these goals often conflict such that there will be
trade-offs encountered in the active pursuit of each. As important, however, are the
numerous constraints that are encountered in evaluating or building a revenue
structure. Still, it seems that the principal question to be asked when attempting such
evaluation is the extent to which incentives or disincentives are inherent in that
structure and how these influence the attainment of the objects. Unless the
incentives to taxpayers, administrators and politicians are considered, it is unlikely
that any set of proposed reforms or alterations in the revenue structure are likely to
be successful.
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